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To the Honorable Elena Kagan, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
and Circuit Justice for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit:
Applicant Kim Davis (“Applicant” or “Davis”) respectfully applies for an emergency stay
pending appeal of a preliminary injunction order entered by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky on August 12, 2015 (hereinafter the “Injunction”) (attached hereto
as Appendix “A”). That Injunction enjoins Davis, the County Clerk for Rowan County, Kentucky,
to issue by her authorization and under her name (not the State) marriage licenses to the four
couples (including two same-sex couples) in this lawsuit, in derogation of her religious liberty and
conscience that dictate to Davis that same-sex unions are not and cannot be “marriage.” App. A.
Similar requests for a stay have been denied by both the district court and the Sixth Circuit. App.
B-D. The temporary stay of the Injunction entered by the district court expires on Monday, August
31, 2015. App. C.
INTRODUCTION
Nearly 70 years ago, on the heels of the Second World War, this Court proclaimed that the
“struggle for religious liberty has through the centuries been an effort to accommodate the
demands of the State to the conscience of the individual,” and the “product of that struggle” is the
“[f]reedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.”1 After all, “[w]e are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”2 The individuals who fashioned those
institutions firmly agreed, as the first Chief Justice of this Court proclaimed, that “security under
our Constitution is given to the rights of conscience.”3 Indeed, those seeking freedom in matters

1

Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 68 (1946).
2
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
3
B.F. Morris, Christian Life and Character of the Civil Institutions of the United States,
Developed in the Official and Historical Annals of the Republic (Philadelphia: George W. Childs,
1

of conscience—though “driven from every other corner of the earth, direct their course to this
happy country as their last asylum.”4 Davis seeks that asylum for her conscience, from this Court.
Davis, a devout Christian, has faithfully and devotedly served the public in the Rowan
County clerk’s office for nearly thirty years. She is one of 120 Kentucky County Clerks, and
oversees one of approximately 137 marriage licensing locations spread throughout Kentucky. No
marriage license can be issued from her office without her authorization and without her personally
affixing thereto her name and endorsement. She has never once raised a religious conscience
objection to performing a function in the county clerk’s office, until now.
On June 26, 2015, immediately following this Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015), the Kentucky Governor (a named party to that consolidated litigation)
issued a directive (the “SSM Mandate”) ordering all Kentucky County Clerks to authorize samesex “marriage” (“SSM”) licenses, without exception. But Davis’ conscience forbids her from
approving a SSM license—because the prescribed form mandates that she authorize the proposed
union and issue a license bearing her own name and imprimatur. She holds an undisputed
sincerely-held religious belief that marriage is a union between a man and a woman, only. Thus,
in her belief, SSM is not, in fact, marriage. If a SSM license is issued with Davis’ name,
authorization, and approval, no one can unring that bell. That searing act of validation would

1864) pp. 162-163 (quoting John Jay); see also, e.g., James Madison, The Writings of James
Madison, Gaillard Hunt, editor (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1906), Vol. VI, p. 102,
“Property,” from the National Gazette, Mar. 29, 1792 (“Government is instituted to protect
property of every sort. . . . [and] conscience is the most sacred of all property.”); Thomas Jefferson,
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew A. Lipscomb, editor (Washington, D.C.: The Thomas
Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), Vol. XVI, p. 332, letter to the Society of the Methodist
Episcopal Church at New London, CT, Feb. 4, 1809 (“No provision in our Constitution ought to
be dearer to man than that which protects the rights of conscience.”); Morris, supra, pp. 162-163
(“Consciences of men are not the objects of human legislation.”) (quoting William Livingston).
4
Samuel Adams, An Oration Delivered to the State House in Philadelphia (Aug. 1, 1776).
2

forever echo in her conscience. And yet, the SSM Mandate demands that she either fall in line (her
conscience be damned) or leave office (her livelihood and job for three-decades in the clerk’s
office be damned). If Davis’ religious objection cannot be accommodated when Kentucky
marriage licenses are available in more than 130 marriage licensing locations, and many other less
restrictive alternatives remain available, then elected officials have no real religious freedom when
they take public office. But such individual rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty are
neither absolutely surrendered at the entry door of public service nor waived upon taking an oath
of office. To suggest otherwise creates a religious (or anti-religious) test for holding office – which
the United States and Kentucky Constitutions expressly forbid.
In the Injunction, the district court leaped over boundary lines recently set by this Court in
deciding a religious conscience dispute arising in the context of another governmental mandate,
by assessing the materiality and substantiality of Davis’ belief while simultaneously conceding its
sincerity. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit magnified the outright disregard for Davis’ religious
conscience by acting as if she does not retain any individual rights in her role as county clerk. But
no court, and especially no third-party desiring to violate religious belief, is fit to set the contours
of conscience. For if that were true, a person who religiously objects to wartime combat would be
forced to shoulder a rifle regardless of their conscience or be refused citizenship; a person who
religiously objects to work on the Sabbath day of their faith would be forced to accept such work
regardless of their conscience or lose access to state unemployment benefits; a person who
religiously objects to state-mandated schooling for their children would be forced to send their
children to school regardless of their conscience or face criminal penalties; a person who
religiously objects to state-approved messages would be forced to carry that message on their
vehicles regardless of their conscience or face criminal penalties; a person who religiously objects
3

to capital punishment would be forced to participate in an execution regardless of their conscience
or lose their job; a person who religiously objects to providing abortion-related and contraceptive
insurance coverage to their employees would be forced to pay for such coverage regardless of their
conscience or face staggering fines. Each of these prior examples illustrate that the majority who
adhere to a general law (regardless of their motivation) do not control the dictates of individual
conscience. And in most cases, this Court has been forced to step-in to ensure that the security
afforded to conscience by the Constitution remains in place when the crucible of public law and
multiple government actors are demanding strict adherence even though true conscience can be
accommodated.
In the same way, a person who objects to SSM based upon religious beliefs that are
measured-in-millenia, indisputably sincere and substantially burdened by threats of loss of job and
three-decades-long livelihood, civil liabilities, punitive damages, and threats of sanctions, should
not be forced to issue by her authorization and under her name a license to a same-sex couple “to
join together in the state of matrimony.” That searing act of personal validation would forever, and
irreversibly, echo in her conscience—and, if it happened, there is no absolution or correction that
any earthly court can provide to rectify it. A stay of the Injunction will halt the irreversible
implications on Davis’ conscience while this case undergoes appellate review, especially since
multiple less restrictive alternatives are available that do not substantially burden Davis (or the
Plaintiffs).
This case is a matter of first impression, left unaddressed following the nascent Obergefell
decision, with far reaching implications across the country for religious liberty. Obergefell
unanimously held that First Amendment protections for religious persons remain despite SSM.
The district court has acknowledged that “this civil action” presents a constitutional “debate,”
4

“tension,” and “conflict” between “two individual liberties held sacrosanct in American
jurisprudence.”5 In the district court’s view, Plaintiffs’ rights trump Davis’ religious rights. But
Davis’ individual liberties are enumerated in the United States and Kentucky Constitutions and a
state Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which predate and survive this Court’s ruling in
Obergefell. Such rights deserve protection before the “demands of the State” irrevocably crush the
“conscience of the individual.”
JURISDICTION
Applicant seeks a stay pending appeal of a U.S. District Court’s preliminary injunction
dated August 12, 2015. The district court temporarily stayed the Injunction until August 31, 2015
to allow Applicant to seek similar relief from the Sixth Circuit, which Applicant did. App. B, C.
But on August 26, 2015, the Sixth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal. App. D. The final
judgment of the Sixth Circuit on appeal is subject to review by this Court under 28 U.S.C. §
1254(1), and this Court therefore has jurisdiction to entertain and grant a request for a stay pending
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f). See, e.g., San Diegans for the Mt. Soledad Nat’l War Memorial
v. Paulson, 548 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2006) (Kennedy, J., in chambers); Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S.
1328, 1330 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) (affirming that there is “no question” that this
Court has jurisdiction to “grant a stay of the District Court’s judgment pending appeal to the Ninth
Circuit when the Ninth Circuit itself has refused to issue the stay”). Additionally, this Court has
authority to issue stays and injunctions in aid of its own jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
and U.S. Supreme Court Rule 23.

Justice Thomas expressly predicted this “inevitable” conflict as individuals “are confronted
with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between same-sex couples.” Obergefell,
135 S.Ct. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
5

5

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.

Kentucky Governor Beshear’s SSM Mandate.
On June 26, 2015, a 5-4 majority of this Court held that laws from four States (including

Kentucky) that defined marriage as the union of a man and a woman were “invalid to the extent
they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as oppositesex couples.” Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2605. Almost immediately, Kentucky Governor Steven L.
Beshear (“Gov. Beshear”) issued his SSM Mandate commanding all county clerks that “[e]ffective
today, Kentucky will recognize as valid all same sex marriages performed in other states and in
Kentucky,” and effectively commandeered full control of Kentucky marriage law and policy postObergefell. See Verified Third-Party Complaint (“VC”) (attached hereto as Appendix “E”), ¶¶ 25,
33, and Ex. C, Ltr. from Gov. Steven L. Beshear to Kentucky County Clerks, dated June 26, 2015
(hereinafter, “Beshear Letter”).
Gov. Beshear further ordered that Kentucky clerks “must license and recognize the
marriages of same-sex couples,” and further instructed that “[n]ow that same-sex couples are
entitled to the issuance of a marriage license, the Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives
will be sending a gender-neutral form to you today, along with instructions for its use.” VC, ¶ 25,
and Ex. C, Beshear Letter. Kentucky’s democratically-approved marriage licensing scheme
(enacted long before Obergefell) provides that “[e]ach county clerk shall use the form proscribed
by the [KDLA] when issuing a marriage license,” and states that the marriage form “shall be
uniform throughout this state.” KY. REV. STAT. §§ 402.100, 402.110. In response to Gov.
Beshear’s directive, the KDLA subsequently provided a new marriage form to county clerks,
including Davis. VC, ¶ 26. The form retained all of the references to “marriage,” as well as the

6

same name, signature and authorization requirements of the county clerk developed before
Obergefell. VC, ¶ 26, and Exs. A, D.
Following Gov. Beshear’s decree, county clerks across Kentucky began issuing SSM
licenses on the new forms, with almost no exception. VC, ¶ 27. According to Gov. Beshear,
“government officials in Kentucky . . . must recognize same-sex marriages as valid and allow them
to take place,” and “[s]ame-sex couples are now being married in Kentucky and such marriages
from other states are now being recognized under Kentucky law.” Id. In these same
pronouncements, Gov. Beshear stated that the “overwhelming majority of county clerks” are
“iss[uing] marriage licenses regardless of gender” and only “two or three” county clerks (of 120)
were “refusing” to issue such licenses due to their “personal beliefs” and “personal feelings.” Id.
In subsequent pronouncements, Gov. Beshear has maintained that county clerks must issue
marriage licenses, including SSM licenses, despite their “own personal beliefs.” VC, ¶ 28. For
Gov. Beshear, the only options available to county clerks who oppose SSM on religious conscience
grounds are (1) issue the licenses against their “personal convictions,” or (2) resign. VC, ¶¶ 28,
36.6

6

Notably, Gov. Beshear did not provide the same ultimatum to Kentucky Attorney General
Jack Conway (“Atty. Gen. Conway”) when he refused to defend the Kentucky Constitution and
democratically-enacted marriage law. VC, ¶¶ 15, 34. According to Atty. Gen. Conway in his
tearful and prayer-induced proclamation at the time, “There are those who believe it’s my
mandatory duty, regardless of my personal opinion, to continue to defend this case…I can only
say that I am doing what I think is right. In the final analysis, I had to make a decision that
I could be proud of – for me now, and my daughters’ judgment in the future.” VC, ¶ 14 (emphasis
added). Gov. Beshear did not force Atty. Gen. Conway to abandon his “inescapable” conscience
and instead hired outside counsel to represent Kentucky in defending its own Constitution and
democratically-enacted laws—which cost the Commonwealth upwards of $200,000. VC, ¶¶ 1415, 34-36.
7

II.

Davis’ sincerely-held religious beliefs about marriage.
Davis serves as the elected county clerk for Rowan County, Kentucky. VC, ¶ 5. Before

taking office as the county clerk in January 2015, she worked at the Rowan County clerk’s office
as a deputy clerk for nearly thirty years. Id. Davis is a professing Apostolic Christian who attends
church worship service multiple times per week, attends weekly Bible study, and leads a weekly
Bible study with women at a local jail. VC, ¶ 16. As a Christian, Davis possesses a sincerely held
religious belief that marriage is a union between one man and one woman, only. VC, ¶ 17. As
county clerk, she authorizes all of the “marriage” licenses issued from her office, and they bear
her name in multiple locations. VC, ¶ 18. But Davis cannot authorize the marriage of same-sex
couples because it violates her religious beliefs and she cannot be a party to the issuance of SSM
licenses: in her belief, authorization and her name endorsement equates to approval and agreement.
VC, ¶ 18.7

7

Under democratically-approved Kentucky marriage law before Obergefell, the specific
form required by the KDLA consists of a marriage license that includes an “authorization
statement of the county clerk issuing the license” and “[t]he date and place the license is issued,
and the signature of the county clerk or deputy clerk issuing the license.” KY. REV. STAT. §
402.100(1); see also VC, ¶ 11. Upon solemnization, the form is to be returned to the county clerk’s
office and “shall provide” certain “information as recorded on the license authorizing the
marriage,” including the “the name of the county clerk under whose authority the license was
issued, and the county in which the license was issued.” KY. REV. STAT. § 402.100(3) (emphasis
added); see also VC, ¶ 11. Any county clerk must include their name and signature four times on
any marriage licenses the clerk signs. See VC, Ex. A, KDLA-Approved Marriage Form PreObergefell, and Ex. D, KDLA-Approved Marriage Form Post-Obergefell. But even on licenses
that the county clerk does not sign, the form requires the clerk to place their name no less than
two times on each and every marriage license issued in the clerk’s county. VC, Exs. A, D. In other
words, no marriage license is issued by a county clerk without their authorization and without their
imprimatur. VC, ¶ 12. The KDLA-approved form describes the act being licensed as “marriage”
at six places, and provides that the county clerk is authorizing the individuals to “join together” in
“the state of matrimony.” VC, ¶ 11, and Exs. A, D.
8

Before taking office as Rowan County clerk, Davis swore an oath to support the
Constitutions and laws of the United States and Kentucky “so help me God.” KY. CONST. § 228.
Davis understood (and understands) this oath to mean that, in upholding the federal and state
constitutions and laws, she would not act in contradiction to the moral law of God, natural law,
and her sincerely held religious beliefs and convictions. VC, ¶ 19. Moreover, she also understood
(and understands) that she swore to uphold the Constitutions and laws that incorporate enumerated
protections for all individuals’ fundamental, “inalienable,” and “inviolate” rights of conscience,
religious liberty, and speech, including her own. See VC, ¶ 19; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI &
amend. I; KY. CONST. Preamble, and §§ 1, 5, 8, 26. Not only that, Kentucky marriage law at the
time she took office (not to mention during her multi-decade tenure as a deputy clerk) perfectly
aligned with her sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage. See VC, ¶¶ 8, 2.8
On June 27, 2015, following the Obergefell decision, Davis discontinued issuing any
marriage licenses. VC, ¶ 29. This was not a “spur-of-the-moment decision” reached by Davis; to
the contrary, it was something that, after exhorting legislators to provide conscience protection for
county clerks, she “had prayed and fasted over weekly” in the weeks and months leading up to the
Obergefell decision. VC, ¶ 29. In fact, before the Obergefell decision (and just one week after this
Court granted certiorari), Davis wrote Kentucky legislators pleading with them to “get a bill on
the floor to help protect clerks” who had a religious objection to authorizing SSM licenses. VC, ¶¶

See also KY. CONST. § 233A (“Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be
valid or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky.”); KY. REV. STAT. § 402.005 (“‘[M]arriage refers
only to the civil status, condition, or relation of one (1) man and one (1) woman united in law for
life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent upon those
whose association is founded on the distinction of sex.”); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589
(Ky. App. Ct. 1973) (holding that two Kentucky women who had applied for a marriage license in
Kentucky were not entitled to one because marriage was “the union of a man and a woman”).
8

9

21-22, and Ex. B, Ltr. From K. Davis to Ky. Sen. Robertson, dated Jan. 23, 2015. Following
Obergefell, Davis sent a letter appealing to Gov. Beshear to uphold her religious conscience rights,
and to call a special session of the Kentucky General Assembly to legislatively address the conflict
between her religious beliefs and the SSM Mandate effected by Gov. Beshear. VC, ¶ 30, and Ex.
E. To date, Davis has received no response to her letter.
Expressly to avoid disparate treatment of any couple and ensure that all individuals and
couples were treated the same, Davis suspended the issuance of all marriage licenses in Rowan
County. VC, ¶ 29. She instructed all deputy clerks to stop issuing marriage licenses because
licenses are issued on her authority, and because every license requires her name to appear on the
license as the authorizing person. During Davis’s entire tenure in the Rowan County clerk’s office,
spanning nearly thirty years, neither Davis, any deputy clerk, nor Davis’s predecessor in office
ever asserted a religious objection to performing any other function of the clerk’s office. VC, ¶ 31.
III.

Plaintiffs’ refusal to obtain a marriage license from someone other than Davis.
On July 2, 2015, less than one week after the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges

and Gov. Beshear issued his SSM Mandate, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit demanding that a particular
person (Davis) in a particular county (Rowan County) authorize and approve their Kentucky
marriage licenses, despite widespread availability of licenses and Davis’ undisputed religious
conscience objection to SSM. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary injunction to bar Davis
from “refusing to issue marriage licenses to any future marriage license applications submitted by
the Named Plaintiffs.” Evidentiary hearings on this motion were held in Ashland, Kentucky (60
miles from the Rowan County clerk’s office), and in Covington, Kentucky (100 miles away),
which were attended by multiple named Plaintiffs.

10

Under Kentucky marriage law predating Obergefell, individuals may obtain a marriage
license from the county clerk in any of Kentucky’s 120 counties, irrespective of their county of
residence. KY. REV. STAT. § 402.080; see also VC, at ¶ 9. In fact, because some counties have
multiple branch offices, there are a total of approximately 137 marriage licensing locations
throughout Kentucky. VC, ¶ 9. Rowan County is bordered by 7 counties, and the clerk’s offices in
these counties are less than an hour from Rowan County clerk’s office. App. A-3. More than ten
other clerks’ offices are within a one hour drive of the Rowan County office, and these counties
are issuing marriage licenses, along with the two counties where preliminary injunction hearings
were held in this matter. But Plaintiffs admitted that they have not even attempted (and do not
intend to attempt) to obtain a license in any county other than Rowan County, despite having the
economic means to do so and no physical handicap preventing such travel. Id.
On August 4, 2015, Davis filed a verified third-party Complaint against Steven L. Beshear,
Governor of Kentucky (“Gov. Beshear”), the issuer of the SSM Mandate, and Wayne Onkst,
Commissioner of Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives, the state agency responsible
for designing Kentucky marriage license forms. See App. E. On August 7, 2015, Davis filed a
motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate and
obtain an exemption “from having to authorize the issuance of Kentucky marriage licenses.” The
grounds on which Davis seeks relief from Gov. Beshear are intertwined with the grounds on which
she opposed Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction against her. Notwithstanding, the district court
entered its Injunction, rather than considering Davis’ and Plaintiffs’ requests together and allowing
Davis to develop a further evidentiary record on her own request for individual accommodation
from Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate.
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IV.

The district court’s Injunction.
The Injunction enjoins Davis “from applying her ‘no marriage licenses’ policy to future

marriage license requests submitted by Plaintiffs.” See App. A-28. The district court stated that
“this civil action presents a conflict between two individual liberties held sacrosanct in American
jurisprudence,” thereby conceding that Davis’ religious rights are, in fact, being both
“threaten[ed]” and “infringe[d]” by Plaintiffs’ demands for her approval of their proposed unions,
and by Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate to provide exactly that or resign. Id. at 2. Notwithstanding,
the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
According to the district court, even though Plaintiffs indisputably are able to obtain a
Kentucky marriage license from more than 130 marriage licensing locations, including all nearby
and surrounding counties, Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their purported right
to marry claims and were being irreparably harmed. See id. at 9-16. In reaching this decision,
however, the district court considered “other Rowan County residents” not before the court on the
Plaintiffs’ motion (which was limited exclusively to the named Plaintiffs) and speculated about
religious accommodation requests that might be made at unspecified times in the future by other
county clerks also not before the court. Id. at 12.
The district court also rejected Davis’ claims under the Kentucky Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“Kentucky RFRA”), KY. REV. STAT. § 446.350, the Free Exercise Clause, the
Free Speech Clause, and the Religious Test Clause of the United States Constitution, and similar
Kentucky Constitution provisions. See App. A-16 to A-28. In rejecting Davis’ religious liberty,
conscience, and speech claims, the district court incorrectly concluded that the Kentucky marriage
license form “does not require the county clerk to condone or endorse same-sex marriage” and
instead merely “asks the county clerk to certify that the information provided is accurate and that
12

the couple is qualified to marry under Kentucky law.”9 According to the district court, the burden
on Davis’ religious freedom is “more slight,” and she “remains free to practice her Apostolic
Christian beliefs” since she “may continue to attend church twice a week, participate in Bible
Study and minister to female inmates at the Rowan County jail,” and “believe that marriage is a
union between one man and one woman.” Id. at 27. But, according to the district court, “her
religious convictions cannot excuse her” from authorizing SSM licenses. See id. at 27-28. Davis
filed an immediate notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), and a
motion to stay pending appeal.
V.

Prior stay requests.
On August 17, 2015, the district court denied Davis’ motion to stay the Injunction pending

appeal, but granted a temporary stay pending the Sixth Circuit’s review of a similar request. See
App. B. In denying this stay request for the same reasons it granted a preliminary injunction, the
district court nonetheless recognized (again) that “constitutional issues” are involved in this
dispute and reiterated that a constitutional “debate” is present in the case at bar and therefore
granted a temporary stay instead. Id. at 1, 7. On August 19, 2015, the district court ordered that its
temporary stay will expire August 31, 2015 absent a contrary Order from the Sixth Circuit. See
App. C. On that same day, Davis filed an emergency motion to stay the Injunction pending appeal
with the Sixth Circuit.

See App. A-22; see also id. at 25 (“[T]he act of issuing a marriage license to a same-sex
couple merely signifies that the couple has met the legal requirements to marry. It is not a sign of
moral or religious approval.”) (emphasis in original); id. at 27 (“Davis is simply being asked to
signify that couples meet the legal requirements to marry. The State is not asking her to condone
same-sex unions on moral or religious grounds, nor is it restricting her from engaging in a variety
of religious activities.”).
9
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On August 26, 2015, the Sixth Circuit denied Davis’ emergency motion to stay the
Injunction pending appeal. See App. D. In denying the stay request, the Sixth Circuit stated that
“[t]he injunction operates not against Davis personally, but against the holder of her office of
Rowan County Clerk,” and further stated that “[i]n light of the binding holding of Obergefell, it
cannot be defensibly argued that the holder of the Rowan County Clerk’s office, apart from who
personally occupies that office, may decline to act in conformity with the United States
Constitution as interpreted by a dispositive holding of the United States Supreme Court.” Id. at 2.
Davis now timely applies for an emergency stay of the Injunction pending appeal.
ARGUMENT
The standards for granting a stay pending appellate review are “well settled.” Deauer v.
United States, 483 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers). As a preliminary matter,
the Rules of this Court require an applicant for a stay to show that “the relief is not available from
any other court or judge,” U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 23—which is plainly satisfied in the case at bar because
both the district court and the Sixth Circuit have refused to grant a stay pending appeal of the
district court’s preliminary injunction order.10 With this showing, a stay is then appropriate if there
is at least: “(1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently
meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse
the judgment below; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a
stay.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam); see also Maryland v. King,
133 S.Ct. 1, 2 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers). Moreover, “[i]n close cases the Circuit Justice

The Sixth Circuit’s internal operating procedures do not permit a stay application addressed
to the en banc court of that Circuit. See 6th Cir. I.O.P. 35(h) (“Petitions seeking rehearing en banc
from other orders [including an order on a motion for stay] will be treated in the same manner as
a petition for panel rehearing. They will be circulated only to the panel judges.”).
10
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or the Court will balance the equities and weigh the relative harms to the applicant and to the
respondent.” Perry, 558 U.S. at 190 (citing Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1988)
(Kennedy, J., in chambers); Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in
chambers); accord, e.g., Conkright v. Frommert, 556 U.S. 1401, 1401 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., in
chambers); Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301,
1302, 1305 (1991) (Scalia, J., in chambers). In reviewing an application for stay pending appeal,
a Circuit Justice must “try to predict whether four Justices would vote to grant certiorari should
the Court of Appeals affirm the District Court order without modification; try to predict whether
the Court would then set the order aside; and balance the so-called ‘stay equities.’” San Diegans,
548 U.S. at 1302 (granting stay pending appeal and quoting INS v. Legalization Assistance Project
of Los Angeles Cnty. Fed’n of Labor, 510 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1993) (O’Connor, J., in chambers). In
this matter, each of the requisite factors weighs decisively in favor of a stay.
In prior marriage cases, this Court granted stays pending appeal, even though the effect of
those stays was to absolutely prevent same-sex couples from obtaining marriage licenses or having
their marriage licenses recognized. See, e.g., Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S.Ct. 893 (2014); McQuigg
v. Bostic, 135 S.Ct. 32 (2014). Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs can indisputably marry whom they want
in Kentucky and obtain a Kentucky marriage license from more than 130 marriage licensing
locations. Moreover, prior cases did not implicate irreversible infringements upon an individual’s
enumerated rights of conscience, religious liberty, and speech, as are involved here.
I.

If the Court of Appeals affirms the district court’s Injunction, there is at least a
reasonable probability that certiorari will be granted.
This first-in-the-nation case following Obergefell presents the inevitable conflict between

SSM rights found by this Court under the Fourteenth Amendment, and enumerated constitutional
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and statutory rights, including the First Amendment and state-based religious freedom laws.11 The
Injunction dictates that SSM trumps religious liberty but, in reaching that conclusion, it outright
flouts the analysis that this Court has described as the “most demanding test known to
constitutional law.”12 The Obergefell decision neither overruled the First Amendment or other
critical religious liberty protections for persons nor compelled States to accomplish recognition
(and equal treatment) of SSM by invading and trampling upon the conscience of individual county
clerks (or other public employees).
In Obergefell, this Court unanimously agreed that First Amendment protections remain
despite SSM. The majority recognized that religious freedoms continue unabated, notwithstanding
the redefinition of marriage:
Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere
to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere
conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not
be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious
organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek
to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their
lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the
family structure they have long revered.
Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2607 (Kennedy, J., majority) (emphasis added). Moreover, the dissenting
justices in Obergefell recognized that “[m]any good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage
as a tenet of faith, and their freedom to exercise religion” is specifically “spelled out” in the First
Amendment of the Constitution. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

11

More than forty percent of the States (twenty-one) have enacted state-based religious
freedom restoration acts patterned after the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Those
states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
12
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (discussing the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act).
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Continuing, the dissenting justices noted that “[r]espect for sincere religious conviction has led
voters and legislators in every State that has adopted same-sex marriage democratically to include
accommodations for religious practice.” Id.; see also id. at 2638 (explaining the historical
significance of “religious liberty”) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, irrespective of the majority’s
conclusion about States’ obligations to recognize SSM, following this Court’s decision in
Obergefell, Gov. Beshear was under no compulsion to order each and every individual Kentucky
County Clerk to authorize and approve SSM marriage licenses bearing their individual name and
requiring their individual approval, without providing any religious accommodation.
In light of the foregoing, this case raises fundamental religious liberty, conscience, and
speech issues in the wake of Obergefell that merit consideration by this Court, including, inter
alia:


Whether religious liberty protections allow persons not to provide marriage-related
services based on their religious beliefs about marriage, when those services are readily
available on equal terms from other persons;



Whether publicly elected officials possess individual free exercise and religious
accommodation rights while holding public office, or whether they may be compelled to
affix their individual name and endorsement to marriage licenses in violation of their
religious beliefs; and



Whether individuals possess a fundamental constitutional right to receive a marriage
license in a particular county authorized by a particular person, irrespective of that person’s
religious beliefs.
After concluding Davis holds sincere beliefs and convictions, the district court nonetheless

proceeded to become the arbiter of the burden placed upon Davis’ religious beliefs, usurping and
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contradicting clear precedent of this Court. Similar to the federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, the religious liberty claims under the state RFRA at issue here ask whether a government
mandate (such as Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate) “imposes a substantial burden on the ability of
the objecting parties” to act “in accordance with their religious beliefs,” not whether Davis’
religious beliefs about authorizing SSM licenses are reasonable. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014) (emphasis in original).
Davis believes that providing the marriage authorization “demanded by” Gov. Beshear’s
SSM Mandate is “connected with” SSM “in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral” for her to
authorize the proposed union and place her name on it. See id. Davis is not claiming that the mere
“administrative” act of recording a document substantially burdens her religious freedom. County
clerks are not mere scriveners for recording a marriage document. Instead, county clerks authorize
the marriage license for the proposed union, place their name on each and every license they
authorize, and call the union “marriage.” See KY. REV. STAT. § 402.100(1)-(3). Such participation
in and approval of SSM substantially burdens Davis’ religious freedom because she is the person
authorizing and approving a proposed union to be a “marriage,” which, in her sincerely-held
religious beliefs, is not a marriage. She can neither call a proposed union “marriage” which is not
marriage in her belief, nor authorize that union. Importantly, Davis is not claiming a substantial
burden on her religious freedom or free speech rights if someone else authorizes and approves a
SSM license devoid of her name. Davis is also not claiming that her religious freedom or free
speech rights are substantially burdened if she must complete an opt-out form to be exempted from
issuing SSM licenses, as Kentucky law already permits for other licensing schemes.
This is the line drawn by Davis’ religious conscience, and it cannot be moved or re-drawn
by a court. Accordingly, it is wrong for the district court to say that Davis’ religious beliefs “are
18

mistaken or insubstantial,” because the “‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’
whether the line drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction,’ and there is no dispute that it does.” Hobby
Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2778-79 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 716 (1981)) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Davis holds sincerelyheld religious beliefs about marriage and the district court agreed—the requisite “honest
conviction.” It is therefore improper to conclude that such beliefs are “more slight,” App. A-27,
for that is just another way of deeming Davis’ religious beliefs as “flawed,” which is a step that
this Court has “repeatedly refused to take.” See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2778. But it is the exact
leap that the district court took in error. By way of Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate, Davis is being
threatened by loss of job, civil liability, punitive damages, sanctions, and private lawsuits in federal
court if she “refuse[s] to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.” KY. REV.
STAT. § 446.350. Certainly, religious liberty protections, including the First Amendment and the
state RFRA here, are designed to protect a person from choosing between one’s lifelong career in
the county clerk’s office and one’s conscience, or between punitive damages and one’s religious
liberty.
Failing to stop this unseemly invasion into Davis’ conscience and religious beliefs, the
Sixth Circuit magnified the outright disregard for a person’s religious liberty by acting as if
the person does not exist. Contrary to the implications of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion denying a
stay, publicly-elected officials possess individual free exercise and speech rights. “Almost fifty
years ago, this Court declared that citizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by
accepting public employment.” Lane v. Franks, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2374 (2014). Indeed, this Court
has “made clear that public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason
of their employment.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). Although a citizen entering
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government service must “by necessity” accept “certain limitations on his or her freedom,” id. at
417, such person’s constitutional rights are not circumscribed in their entirety. Instead, there are
“some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty” that a citizen is “‘not deprived of [these]
fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.’” Borough of Duryea, Pa. v.
Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. 2488, 2493-94 (2011) (citation omitted). Fundamental rights are implicated
in this case, as the district court already acknowledged. Thus, contrary to the implications set forth
in the Sixth Circuit order, a person’s constitutional and statutory rights and liberties are not
immediately eviscerated the moment they take their oath of office.
Not only that, this Court has concluded that “government may (and sometimes must)
accommodate religious practices.” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S.
136, 144-45 (1987). After all, “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being.” Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313. Further, government may not “oppos[e] or show[]
hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.’”
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). The First Amendment of
the United States Constitution requires that government must not “prohibit[] the free exercise” of
religion, U.S. CONST. amend I, and ensures that a person may “express himself in accordance with
the dictates of his own conscience.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985). The Free Exercise
Clause protects “not only belief and profession but the performance (or abstention from) physical
acts.” Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990).13

13

The Kentucky Constitution also provides expansive constitutional protections for religious
liberties and conscience. KY. CONST., § 1 (identifying the “inherent and inalienable rights” of
persons, including the “right of worshipping Almighty God according to the dictates of their
20

Providing accommodation for religious conviction is not antithetical for public employees
or inconsistent with governmental mandates. For instance, religious companies with consciencebased objections to governmental mandates and programs related to providing abortion-related
insurance coverage may be exempted from generally applicable requirements. See Hobby Lobby,
134 S.Ct. at 2759 (holding that government mandate to force closely held corporations to provide
health insurance coverage for methods of contraception that violated the sincerely-held religious
beliefs of the companies’ owners was an unlawful burden on religious exercise). Moreover,
persons can be naturalized as citizens with conscience-based non-combatant objections, Girouard,
328 U.S. at 64-67, or religious-based objections to certain vaccinations, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g). By
way of further example, federal and state employees who have a “moral or religious” conviction
against capital punishment are provided an exemption from “be[ing] in attendance at” or
“participat[ing] in any prosecution or execution” performed under the Federal Death Penalty Act.
18 U.S.C. § 3597(b).
The foregoing examples illustrate that, in certain matters, the law already accounts for
religious-based objections to generally applicable legal duties or mandates. In each of the
foregoing areas (i.e., abortion, capital punishment, non-combatant in wartime), there are wellestablished historical roots for the objection. For marriage, the nature of the objection is even more
firmly established in history because the “meaning of marriage” as a union between one man and
one woman “has persisted in every culture,” “has formed the basis of human society for millennia,”
and has singularly “prevailed in the United States throughout our history.” Obergefell, 135 S.Ct.

consciences”); id., § 5 (“[T]he civil rights, privileges or capacities of no person shall be taken
away, or in anywise diminished or enlarged, on account of his belief or disbelief of any religious
tenet, dogma or teaching. No human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with
the rights of conscience.”).
21

at 2612-13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 2641 (“For millennia, marriage was
inextricably linked to the one thing that only an opposite-sex couple can do: procreate.”) (Alito,
J., dissenting). In fact, the majority in Obergefell understood that the institution of marriage as
exclusively a union between a man and a woman “has existed for millennia and across
civilizations,” and acknowledged that this view “long has been held—and continues to be held—
in good faith by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the world.” Obergefell,
135 S.Ct. at 2594 (Kennedy, J., majority) (emphasis added).
Accommodating a person’s sincere religious beliefs and practices about marriage and
ensuring that individual religious freedom is not substantially burdened promotes the religious
pluralism and tolerance that have made this country distinctive. Of course, religious
accommodations are not provided for each and every whim or scruple raised by a person, and
merely stating a religious objection does not mean that any county clerk can deny a marriage
license at any time for any reason. That is not this case. As noted above, Davis has served in the
Rowan County clerk’s office for thirty years, and, during this entire time period, this is the first
instance in which she (or anyone else for that matter) has raised a religious objection to performing
a function in the county clerk’s office. See VC, ¶ 31. Plainly, this is not a situation where an
accommodation of Davis’ religious objections will swallow the general law on marriage and
marriage licenses in Kentucky, because licenses are readily available in more than 130 marriage
licensing locations spread across Kentucky. See VC, ¶¶ 9, 27.
Additionally, the lower courts cannot avoid the implications upon the religious and speech
rights of Davis merely by ordering relief against Davis in her official capacity. The official capacity
designation requires an individual person to occupy the office. It is not as if Kim Davis the
individual stops existing while Kim Davis is performing her duties as Rowan County Clerk.
22

Moreover, Plaintiffs sued Davis in her individual capacity seeking punitive damages from her
personally. By suing her individually, Plaintiffs concede the relevancy of Davis in her individual
capacity as the person occupying the office of Rowan County clerk. Further, the injunctive relief
Plaintiffs obtained against Davis in her official capacity (the issuance of a marriage license)
necessarily implicates Davis in her individual capacity because of her personal involvement in the
act of issuing, authorizing, endorsing, and participating in a marriage license. Lastly, Davis in her
official capacity has an obligation to comply with all constitutional norms, protections, and
obligations that affect individual persons—including her own individual capacity. It is thus an
untenable judicial construct and fiction to claim that the individual conscience, religious, and
speech protections afforded Davis are of no consequence to her official capacity conduct.
Further, the Injunction grants to Plaintiffs a newfound federal constitutional right—to
obtain immediately a marriage license in a particular county authorized and signed by a
particular person, irrespective of the burdens placed upon that individual’s fundamental
freedoms. But no precedent from this Court, including Obergefell, establishes such a fundamental
constitutional right. This case is not about whom a person may marry under Kentucky law. No
state-wide ban is absolutely preventing any Plaintiff from marrying whom they want to marry.
This case is also not about whether Plaintiffs can obtain a Kentucky marriage license. They can.
Such licenses, including SSM licenses, are readily available across Kentucky. This case is also not
about whether Kentucky will recognize SSM. The Kentucky Governor has declared that Kentucky
will. Instead, this case is about forcing an individual county clerk (Davis) to authorize and
personally approve SSM in violation of her fundamental religious liberty and speech rights, now.
The right to marry cases from this Court do not create a fundamental right to receive a
marriage license from a particular person. Critically, the cases of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
23

(1968), Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and
Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584, all involved state-wide absolute (or near absolute) bans affecting
marriage. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12 (striking down Virginia ban on inter-racial
marriages); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 379, 390-91 (striking down Wisconsin law that required any
resident with child support obligations to satisfy such obligations before marrying and to obtain a
court order permitting the marriage); Turner, 482 U.S. at 81-82, 99 (striking down Missouri prison
regulation that represented a near “almost complete ban” on inmate marriage); Obergefell, 135
S.Ct. at 2593, 2599-2605 (redefining marriage to include same-sex couples, and striking down
Kentucky, Tennessee, Michigan and Ohio marriage laws to the contrary). Some of the restrictions
also came with criminal penalties attached for violating the terms of the restrictions (e.g., Loving
and Zablocki). Furthermore, none of those cases also involved the religious conscience and First
Amendment objections present here.
Finally, the Injunction short-circuits the legislative process in Kentucky and converts every
marriage-related law in all fifty states into a constitutional matter subject to injunction practice in
federal courts (before legislatures can even respond to this Court’s decision in Obergefell), even
though laws regarding “the definition and regulation of marriage” have “long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the States.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2689-91
(2013). State marriage laws differ across the country, and Kentucky marriage law is far less
restrictive than other states.14 Prior to Obergefell, most of the States’ democratically-enacted
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For instance, some states require prospective couples to obtain a license in the county
where the ceremony will occur, see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-401(a), whereas others
permit residents to obtain their license in one county and hold their ceremony in another county,
see, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. §§ 402.050, 402.080, 402.100; MINN. STAT. § 517.07. Some states
require prospective couples to obtain their license in their home county, see, e.g., MICH. COMP.
24

marriage laws and domestic relations legislation rested upon a definition of marriage as between
a man and a woman, and state legislatures are only just beginning to respond to the comprehensive
changes resulting from Obergefell. The legislatures must have time to craft democraticallyapproved solutions that protect a fundamental right to marry vis-à-vis other fundamental rights.
II.

If the Court of Appeals affirms the district court’s Injunction, there is at least a fair
prospect of reversal.
As the district court concluded, this case presents a constitutional “debate,” “conflict,” and

“tension” between “two individual liberties held sacrosanct in American jurisprudence”—one
enumerated and express (Davis’ religious freedom), and the other unenumerated (right to marry).
See App. A-2, A-16; App. B-1 (reiterating the existence of a constitutional “debate”). The district
court rendered a decision on the constitutional “debate” at issue—but that answer should not be
forced upon Davis until her appeal is finally resolved. Under the precedent of this Court, Davis
possesses a fair prospect of reversal of the district court Injunction. To ensure Davis’ fundamental
and “sacrosanct” rights remain protected during appellate review, a stay of the Injunction is
appropriate.
A.

The Constitutions of the United States and Kentucky, and a state-based RFRA
law protect Davis’ conscience and religious freedom from being coerced to
authorize and approve SSM licenses bearing her name.

Davis’ inability to authorize and approve SSM licenses bearing her imprimatur against her
religious conscience is protected by the United States and Kentucky Constitutions, along with the
Kentucky RFRA. See U.S. CONST., amend I; KY. CONST., §§ 1, 5; KY. REV. STAT. § 446.350. The

LAWS § 551.101; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.05(a), whereas others allow residents to obtain a
license in any county, see KY. REV. STAT. § 402.080; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-103. Some states
require prospective couples to wait to receive their license upon application, see, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 551.103a (3 days); MINN. STAT. § 517.08(a) (5 days), whereas others (e.g., Kentucky,
Ohio, Tennessee) have no waiting period.
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Kentucky RFRA, which was enacted by an overwhelming majority in 2013 over Gov. Beshear’s
veto, protects a person’s15 “right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held
religious belief,” and this religious freedom right “may not be substantially burdened unless the
government proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has a compelling governmental
interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive means to
further that interest.” KY. REV. STAT. § 446.350; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (explaining “the
‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief and profession but the performance (or
abstention from) physical acts”).16 As such, this state RFRA protects not only a person’s beliefs
but also a person’s actions (or non-actions) based thereon, and subjugates to the strictest scrutiny
any governmental action (be it legislative or regulatory scheme, or executive action) infringing
religiously-motivated actions (or non-actions).17 The Kentucky RFRA is similar to (but goes even
further in protecting religious liberties than) the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) & (b), which was enacted to “provide very broad protection for religious
liberty,” Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2760, and imposes “the most demanding test known to

The Kentucky RFRA protects the religious freedom of all “persons” in Kentucky. While
“person” is not defined in the Kentucky RFRA, it is defined in Kentucky’s general definitions
statute to include “individuals,” and publicly elected officials are not excluded. See KY. REV.
STAT. § 446.010(33).
16
Because Davis’ free exercise claim is combined with a free speech claim, her free exercise
claim is also subject to strict scrutiny. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
17
The Kentucky RFRA is housed under Chapter 446 of Kentucky’s statutes, which is entitled
“Construction of Statutes,” and includes such other generally applicable provisions as “Definitions
for Statutes Generally,” “Computation of Time,” “Severability,” and “Titles, Headings, and
Notes.” KY. REV. STAT. §§ 446.010, 446.030, 446.090, 446.140. Even more specifically, the
Kentucky RFRA is included under a section of Chapter 446 reserved for “Rules of Codification.”
As such, Kentucky marriage law cannot be interpreted without also considering and applying the
Kentucky RFRA, an analysis which both the district court and Sixth Circuit have ignored. But this
analysis is especially significant in the wake of Obergefell and Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate.
15
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constitutional law.” Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534. Thus, Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate—the state
action here—must survive strict scrutiny.
1.

Davis’ religious freedom is being substantially burdened by the SSM
Mandate.

As indicated above, the Kentucky RFRA protects a person’s “right to act or refuse to act
in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.” As such, the Kentucky RFRA is not
solely directed at what a person may believe—but also how those beliefs translate to actions (or
non-actions). Davis indisputably holds sincere religious beliefs about marriage and her inability to
issue SSM licenses is motivated by those convictions. See VTC, ¶¶ 17-18. The prescribed form
under Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate provided no opportunity for the religious objector Davis not
to participate in endorsement and approval of SSM. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the
“authorization” or permission to marry unmistakably comes from Davis. Davis is also required
to put her name and imprimatur no less than two times on each and every marriage license
she issues. But Davis cannot authorize a union of two persons which, in her sincerely-held belief,
is not marriage. To authorize a SSM license bearing her imprimatur sears her conscience because
she would be endorsing the proposed union and calling something “marriage” that is not marriage
according to her beliefs. See VTC, ¶¶ 17-18.
Forcing Davis to authorize SSM licenses substantially burdens her religious freedom. Gov.
Beshear has flatly rejected Davis’ request for religious exemption. In his view, Davis must either
comply with his SSM Mandate, or resign from office. VTC, ¶¶ 28, 36.18 Thus, Gov. Beshear is
In addition to his unmitigated “approve or resign” rule, Gov. Beshear has ominously
declared that “the courts” will deal with county clerks who do not comply with his SSM Mandate.
See VTC, ¶ 35. Moreover, immediately after issuance of the SSM Mandate, Atty. Gen. Conway
even threatened possible legal action against county clerks who did not comply with the SSM
Mandate, even seemingly inviting this very lawsuit against Davis: “Any clerk that refuses to issue
18

27

imposing a direct and severe pressure on Davis by the SSM Mandate, forcing Davis “to choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits [her job], on the one hand,
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work [keep her job], on the
other hand.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). This Hobson’s choice places undue
pressure on Davis to choose between her job and her religion. Loss of job. Civil liability. Sanctions.
Private lawsuits in federal court. Davis is being threatened with all of the above if she chooses to
adhere to her sincere religious beliefs. Certainly, religious liberty protections are designed to
protect a person from such substantial burdens.
It is not for the district court to question the reasonableness or scriptural accuracy of Davis’
beliefs about marriage. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2779 (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716). As
indicated above, judges “are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation,” and they are not tasked with
determining who “more correctly” perceives their faith’s commands; instead, the “narrow
function” is to determine whether the line drawn reflects an “honest conviction”. Thomas, 450
U.S. at 716. There is no dispute that the requisite “honest conviction” exists here, but the district
court proceeded to decide that the burden on Davis is “more slight.” See App. A-5, A-15, A-22,
A-27. In concluding that the act of issuing SSM licenses would not severely burden Davis’
religious convictions because such act would not implicate moral or religious approval of SSM,

marriage licenses is opening himself or herself to potential legal liability and sanctions. Any couple
or person denied a license may seek remedy in federal court, but should consult with a private
attorney about their particular situation.” See, e.g., Several county clerks defy same-sex marriage
ruling, refuse to issue marriage licenses, Lexington Herald-Leader, June 29, 2015, available at
http://www.kentucky.com/2015/06/29/3923157_some-kentucky-county-clerksrefusing.html?rh=1 (last accessed August 28, 2015); Steve Beshear and Jack Conway: On refusing
marriage
licenses,
WTVQ.com,
June
30,
2015,
available
at
http://www.wtvq.com/story/d/story/steve-beshear-and-jack-conway-on-refusingmarriage/39801/_4cM2DBkQ0aBolGpMeZz_A (last accessed August 28, 2015).
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the district court essentially told Davis what her religious convictions should be, instead of
recognizing the undisputed fact of what her religious convictions actually are, and that those
convictions unmistakably bar her from issuing SSM licenses with her name plastered on them.
That conclusion disregards this Court’s precedent analyzing substantial burdens on religious
freedom.
2.

The SSM Mandate cannot survive strict scrutiny analysis.

To overcome this substantial burden on Davis’ religious freedom, Gov. Beshear must
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Kentucky has (1) a compelling governmental
interest in infringing Davis’ religious conscience through the SSM Mandate and (2) it has used the
least restrictive means to accomplish that interest. Under this strict scrutiny analysis, to be a
compelling governmental interest, the SSM Mandate must further an interest “of the highest
order,” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993), and, “[i]f
a less restrictive alternative would serve Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (emphasis
added).
Under the required strict scrutiny analysis, only a compelling governmental interest in
infringing upon Davis’ inability to authorize and approve SSM licenses will suffice—the specific
act or refusal to act at issue. This “more focused” inquiry “requires the Government to demonstrate
that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the
person’—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religions is being substantially
burdened,” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31
(2006) (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)), and further requires courts “to ‘loo[k]
beyond broadly formulated interests’ and to ‘scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific
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exemptions to particular religious claimants’—in other words, to look to the marginal interest
in enforcing” the SSM Mandate in this case. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2779 (emphasis added)
(quoting O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431); see also Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584
(2000) (explaining that compelling interest determination “is not to be made in the abstract” but
instead “in the circumstances of this case” and how the asserted interest is “addressed by the law
at issue”). Here, there is no compelling government interest “beyond broadly formulated interests”
in infringing upon Davis’ inability to authorize SSM licenses, and no one has shown why granting
a “specific exemption” to this “particular religious claimant,” O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431, will
commit a “grave[] abuse[], endangering paramount interests,” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945), that will endanger the Commonwealth of Kentucky, let alone Kentucky’s marriage
licensing scheme.
But even if this showing can be made, the infringement upon Davis must still satisfy the
“exceptionally demanding” least-restrictive-means standard. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2780.
No one has demonstrated that Kentucky “lacks other means” of issuing marriage licenses to samesex couples “without imposing a substantial burden” on Davis’ “exercise of religion.” Id. Not only
that, the least-restrictive-means test may “require the Government to expend additional funds” to
accommodate “religious beliefs,” id. at 2781. In this matter, even if the “desired goal” is providing
Plaintiffs with Kentucky marriage licenses in Rowan County19, see id., numerous less restrictive
means are available to accomplish it without substantially burdening Davis’ religious freedom
and conscience, such as:


Providing an opt-out or exemption to the Kentucky marriage licensing scheme (as
exists for the Kentucky fish and wildlife licensing scheme), KY. REV. STAT. §

19

Nothing in Obergefell suggests that Plaintiffs have a fundamental right to receive a
marriage license from a particular clerk, in a particular county.
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150.195, and as other states, such as North Carolina, have enacted, see, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 51-5.5 (permitting recusal of officials from “issuing” lawful marriage
licenses “based upon any sincerely held religious objection”);


Deputizing a neighboring county clerk (or some other person) to issue Kentucky
marriage licenses in Rowan County;



Modifying the prescribed Kentucky marriage license form to remove the multiple
references to Davis’ name, and thus to remove the personal nature of the
authorization that Davis must provide on the current form;



Deeming Davis “absent” for purposes of issuing SSM licenses, based upon her
moral and religious inability to issue them, and allowing those licenses to be issued
by the chief executive of Rowan County, as specifically authorized by Kentucky
law, see KY. REV. STAT. § 402.240;



Distributing Kentucky marriage licenses at the state-level through an online or other
state-wide licensing scheme; or



Legislatively addressing Kentucky’s entire marriage licensing scheme postObergefell,20 whether immediately by calling a special legislative session or in
three months in the next regular legislative session.

All of the foregoing options, and others, are available to avoid substantially burdening
Davis’ personal religious freedom in the wake of the redefinition of marriage in Obergefell.
Furthermore, Gov. Beshear is not applying Kentucky marriage law in a neutral and
generally applicable manner through his SSM Mandate because it specifically targets county clerks
like Davis who possesses certain religious beliefs about marriage. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
This targeting is demonstrated by the exemption Gov. Beshear granted to Atty. Gen. Conway
when—after “pray[ing] over this decision”—he was unwilling to defend Kentucky’s

20

For instance, one prefiled bill for the next regular session expressly protects clerks such as
Davis because it amends the Kentucky RFRA to state expressly that “[i]ssuing or recording a
marriage license” to which “a person holds a sincere religious objection” shall be considered “a
substantial burden for which there is no compelling government interest, and that person shall
additionally be immune from any civil or criminal liability for declining to solemnize such a
marriage.” See An Act Relating to Marriage, Ky. House Bill 101 (2016 Reg. Sess.).
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democratically-enacted marriage law pursuant to his own personal beliefs and feelings (his
purported conscience) about “doing what I think is right” and “mak[ing] a decision that I could be
proud of.” See VC, ¶¶ 14-15, 34.
As such, Gov. Beshear is picking and choosing the conscience-based exemptions to
marriage that he deems acceptable—which is constitutionally unacceptable. For instance, when
Atty. Gen. Conway refused to defend the Kentucky Constitution on marriage, Gov. Beshear did
not direct Conway that “Neither your oath nor the Supreme Court dictates what you must believe.
But as elected officials, they do prescribe how we must act,” but he did so direct county clerks like
Davis. See VC, ¶ 35, and Ex. C, Beshear Letter. Gov. Beshear did not command Atty. Gen.
Conway that “when you accepted this job and took that oath, it puts you on a different level,” and
“[y]ou have official duties now that the state law puts on you,” but he did deliver this command to
county clerks like Davis. See VC, ¶¶ 28, 35. Gov. Beshear did not publicly proclaim that Atty.
Gen. Conway was “refusing to perform [his] duties” and failing to “follow[] the law and carry[]
out [his] duty,” and should instead “comply with the law regardless of [his] personal beliefs,” but
he did make this proclamation (repeatedly) about county clerks like Davis See VC, ¶¶ 27, 35. Gov.
Beshear did not instruct Atty. Gen. Conway that “if you are at that point to where your personal
convictions tell you that you simply cannot fulfill your duties that you were elected to do, than
obviously the honorable course to take is to resign and let someone else step-in who feels that they
can fulfill these duties,” but he did issue this instruction to county clerks like Davis. See VC, ¶¶
28, 35. Gov. Beshear did not ominously declare that “[t]he courts and voters will deal appropriately
with” Atty. Gen. Conway, but he did so declare with the “two or three” county clerks who are not
issuing marriage licenses. See VC, ¶¶ 27, 35. Thus, although Atty Gen. Conway was given a pass
for his conscience about marriage without any threats of repercussion, Davis is being repeatedly
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told by Gov. Beshear to abandon her religiously-informed beliefs or resign. There is no compelling
reason, let alone an “interest of the highest order,” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546, to impose this choice
on Davis when no “substantial threat to public safety, peace or order” is at stake, Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 403-04.
3.

The SSM Mandate also constitutes an impermissible religious test.

Further, compelling Davis to authorize marriages against her sincerely held religious
beliefs about marriage constitutes an improper religious test for holding (or maintaining) public
office. U.S. CONST. art. VI (“no religious test” permitted as a “qualification” for office). Davis is
being arm-twisted to either participate in the issuance of SSM licenses or resign from the office
where she has worked for nearly three-decades, since holding public office is her choice. But the
fact “that a person is not compelled to hold office” is not an excuse for Gov. Beshear (or the district
court) to impose constitutionally-forbidden, conscience-violating criteria for office. See Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961). Indeed, the very idea that religious persons “need not
apply” for these public positions that have historically been accessible to them constitutes an
unmistakable religious litmus test that is “abhorrent to our tradition.” Girouard, 328 U.S. at 68.
The case of Girouard v. United States, supra, is instructive here. In Girouard, a Canadian
native filed a petition for naturalization and stated in his application that “he understood the
principles of the government of the United States, believed in its form of government, and was
willing to take the oath of allegiance,” that included swearing an oath “to support and defend the
Constitution . . . So help me God,” that was “in no material respect different from” the oath of
office for public officials. 328 U.S. at 62, 65. But in answering the question on his application
regarding whether he was willing to take-up arms in defense of his country, he stated that his
religious beliefs prevented him from “combatant military duty.” Id. at 62. He was willing to serve
33

in the army, just not bearing arms. Id. The district court admitted him for citizenship, which the
court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court then reversed the court of appeals since “[o]ne may
serve his country “faithfully and devotedly, though his religious scruples make it impossible for
him to shoulder a rifle.” Id. at 64. The fact that his role may be limited “by religious convictions”
had no bearing “on his attachment to his country or on his willingness to support and defend it to
his utmost.” Id. at 65. In rejecting argument that the individual could not support and defend the
Constitution, the Supreme Court concluded that “[i]t is hard to believe that one need forsake his
religious scruples to become a citizen but not to sit in the high councils of state,” acknowledging
thereby that persons need not forsake their “religious scruples” to “sit in the high councils of state.”
Id. at 66. As further evidence of the parallels to be drawn in this scenario, the religious conscience
objection was acceptable in light of the historical back-up for the belief. See id. at 64-65. Finally,
the importance of protecting religious liberty in this country cannot be overemphasized:
The struggle for religious liberty has through the centuries been an
effort to accommodate the demands of the State to the conscience of
the individual. The victory for freedom of thought recorded in our
Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is a
moral power higher than the State. Throughout the ages men have
suffered death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the
authority of the State. Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First
Amendment is the product of that struggle.
Girouard, 328 U.S. at 68. Like a non-combatant who cannot shoulder a rifle, a county clerk who
cannot issue SSM licenses can still faithfully and devotedly serve this country, and their county.
In Gov. Beshear’s view, which is apparently shared by Plaintiffs in the underlying action,
Davis, who became county clerk before Obergefell, must either participate without exception in
the issuance of SSM marriage licenses (her conscience be damned) or resign since holding public
office is her choice (her livelihood, qualifications for office, and commitment to public service be
damned). Thus, she is told to cast aside her deep religious convictions after entering the door of
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public service, and those not yet serving in similar public roles are told to shed any such
convictions before taking office. Imposing on all public employees—whether elected, appointed,
or hired—a mandate to participate in SSM, without any reasonable accommodation for religious
conscience (or even consideration of any requests for accommodation), violates the First
Amendment and Religious Test Clause.
B.

The Constitutions of the United States and Kentucky protect Davis from being
forced to affix her name and endorsement to a SSM license.

The mandate commanding Davis to affix her name to SSM licenses also violates her
fundamental free speech rights protected by the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. U.S.
CONST. amend. I (government may not “abridg[e] the freedom of speech”); KY. CONST., § 1
(persons have an inalienable right of “freely communicating their thoughts and opinions”); id., §
8 (“[e]very person may freely and fully speak”). The Free Speech Clause protects “both what to
say and what not to say,” Riley v. Nat’l Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988)
(emphasis added), and states may not “force[] an individual, as part of [their] daily life” to “be an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view [he/she] finds
unacceptable.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1976).
The prescribed Kentucky marriage form adopted by Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate uses
the word “marriage” at six different places on the form, specifically states that the county clerk is
authorizing a couple to be “join[ed] together in the state of matrimony,” twice designates Davis by
name (“KIM DAVIS”) as the person authorizing the marriage license (not the State), and requires
the stamping of her name and endorsement on the proposed union (not a State seal). See See VC,
¶¶ 11-12, and Exs. A, D; see also KY. REV. STAT. § 402.100(3). Unlike other governmental
licensing or registration schemes that Kentucky provides (e.g., driver’s licenses, fishing and
hunting licenses, motor vehicle registration, voter registration), the issuance of a marriage license
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requires an individual person (the county clerk) to authorize, against individual religious
convictions, a particular relationship between persons. As it currently stands, Davis’ name and
approval cannot be divorced from a SSM license.
Thus, even if the license entails government speech to a certain degree, it also necessarily
implicates the private speech of Davis, whose imprimatur and authority must be stamped on every
license she issues. See Wooley, 430 U.S. 705 (engraved message on standardized, state-issued
license plates implicated driver’s free speech rights). The compelled-speech doctrine protects
Davis from being coerced into placing her imprimatur on a union that, in her belief, is not a
marriage. Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005) (“compelled-speech”
doctrine applies when “an individual is obliged personally to express a message he disagrees with,
imposed by the government.”). For Gov. Beshear to state that Kentucky is issuing and recognizing
SSM licenses is one thing. But commanding Davis to be an “instrument” for a message, view, and
proposed union that she finds “morally objectionable” and “repugnant to [her] moral and religious
beliefs” is altogether different, and violates not only her conscience, but also her free speech rights.
See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
C.

No marriage right announced in Obergefell or this Court’s prior decisions is
violated by a statewide Kentucky marriage policy that treats all couples the
same and rightfully accommodates the religious conscience rights of county
clerks under the Kentucky RFRA and the United States and Kentucky
Constitutions.

The merits of Plaintiffs’ claims must be evaluated in terms of Kentucky’s state-wide
marriage licensing scheme and whether that scheme, which is currently providing more than 130
locations for Plaintiffs to obtain marriage licenses, directly and substantially burdens the Plaintiffs’
rights to marry whom they choose. As shown above, supra, no precedent from this Court, including
Obergefell, establishes a fundamental constitutional right to obtain immediately a marriage license
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in a particular county authorized and signed by a particular person, irrespective of the burdens
placed upon that person’s freedoms. See Loving, Zablocki, Turner, and Obergefell, supra. Thus, a
statewide policy that accommodates the individual freedoms of Davis under the Kentucky RFRA
and the United States and Kentucky Constitutions, while leaving marriage licenses readily
available to every couple throughout every region of the state, does not prevent any Plaintiff from
marrying whom they want to marry.
III.

Absent a stay pending appeal, Davis is likely—indeed certain—to face substantial and
irreparable harm.
Absent a stay, Davis faces imminent, substantial, and irreversible harm if she is forced to

authorize and approve even one SSM license with her name on it, against her religious conscience,
for it is well-established law that “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
There is no adequate or corrective relief that will be available at a later date of this litigation
(including a permanent injunction in her favor) if Davis is forced to violate her religious conscience
now. It is comparable to forcing the religious objecting nurse to perform an abortion, the religious
objecting company or non-profit to pay for abortions or abortion-related insurance coverage, the
religious objecting non-combatant to fire on an enemy soldier, or the religious objecting state
official to participate in or attend the execution of a convicted prisoner. Ordering Davis to authorize
and approve a SSM license is the act that violates her conscience and substantially burdens her
religious freedom – an act which cannot be undone.
Additionally, the harm to Davis is not speculative but imminent. The searing act of her
conscience is authorizing a SSM license bearing her imprimatur; Plaintiffs insist on having no one
other than Davis approve their proposed union; and the district court has ordered Davis to approve
SSM licenses. The Sixth Circuit refused to stay the Injunction pending appeal. This impending
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harm to Davis’ conscience outweighs any travel inconveniences on Plaintiffs, who can obtain (or
could have already obtained) a marriage license from more than 130 licensing locations across
Kentucky while the appeal is pending.
IV.

The balancing of equities and public interest favor granting a stay.
The public has no interest in coercing Davis to irreversibly violate her conscience and

religious freedom when ample less restrictive alternatives are readily available, and the balancing
of the equities favors granting a stay. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2767, 2780-81; KY. REV.
STAT. § 446.350.21
In stark contrast to the imminent and forever irreversible harm facing Davis, Kentucky is
indisputably recognizing marriages, including SSM, so Plaintiffs can marry whom they want (even
while this appeal is pending). Also, Kentucky is providing for the issuance of marriage licenses
in more than 130 marriage licensing locations spread across the state, including many locations
within 30-45 minutes of where Plaintiffs allegedly reside, so Plaintiffs can readily obtain Kentucky
marriage licenses from any one of those locations (even while this appeal is pending). Nothing
(and no one) is physically or economically preventing the named Plaintiffs in this case from
obtaining a marriage license elsewhere in Kentucky. Accordingly, the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims
must be evaluated in terms of Kentucky’s state-wide marriage licensing scheme and whether that
scheme, which is currently providing more than 130 locations for Plaintiffs to obtain marriage
licenses, directly and substantially burdens these Plaintiffs’ right to marry. The Injunction
significantly changes the relative position of the parties and, in fact, completely alters

21

See also notes 1-4, supra.
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(prematurely) the status quo existing between the parties at a time when there is ongoing public
debate in Kentucky between the SSM Mandate and religious liberty.
Yet Plaintiffs demand (and the district court erred in finding) a newfound constitutional
right to have a marriage license issued by a particular person in a particular county, irrespective of
the burdens placed upon that individual’s freedoms. Plaintiffs concede they can obtain Kentucky
marriage licenses in another county and from someone other than Davis. They simply chose (and
choose) not to. According to Plaintiffs’ unprecedented view, and adopted in error by the district
court, the mere act of traveling approximately 30 minutes equates to a federal constitutional
violation of the right to marry and, not just that, but a violation purportedly so manifest that it
trumps individual conscience and religious freedom protections that are enumerated in the United
States and Kentucky Constitutions and a state RFRA. But this alleged burden is no more
constitutionally suspect than having to drive 30 minutes to a government office (for any reason) in
the first place. As such, Plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable and irreversible injury if resolution is
postponed to await a decision on the merits of Davis’ appeal. This conclusion comports with the
stay orders pending appeal entered in prior marriage cases. But, since those stay orders prohibited
the issuance of SSM licenses or recognition of SSM in their entirety, the potential purported harm
to Plaintiffs here is far less.
Accordingly, the balancing of the equities and public interest favor granting a stay of the
Injunction pending resolution of Davis’ appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The Applicant respectfully requests that the Circuit Justice issue the requested stay of the
district court’s preliminary injunction order pending appeal. The Applicant also requests that the
Circuit Justice issue a temporary stay of the district court’s preliminary injunction order while the
merits of the stay application are being considered. If the Circuit Justice is either disinclined to
grant the requested relief or simply wishes to have the input of the full Court on this application,
Applicant respectfully requests that it be referred to the full Court.
Dated: August 28, 2015
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